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INTRODUCTION
Meet Pete. Pete is an average, nondescript sports fan who works
1
hard during the day and enjoys fantasy football. Pete does not have a
law degree, and his only knowledge of the law behind fantasy sports
comes from a segment he recently heard on ESPN, about Major League
Baseball being sued over the right to use player names and statistics for
2
fantasy baseball purposes. In response to this court decision, which
seriously limited the ability of major sports leagues to license the
statistics of their athletes, the National Football League (NFL)
determined that it could make more money off of fantasy football by
offering fantasy football participants an official “NFL Championship
3
Package.” Pete learns that this package is available for download or on
CD and includes various forms to help participants conduct their fantasy
football draft and track their teams throughout the season.
Additionally, Pete is interested in the sortable data collection of the
athletes’ statistics from the last three seasons that is included with the
Championship Package. Strangely, the NFL’s Championship Package is
completely devoid of any software; it consists solely of various files that
contain the players’ information.
Although Pete wants his fantasy football team to prevail this year,
he feels the NFL’s price of $59.99 (not including tax or shipping and
handling) is too steep. Instead of purchasing the content online, Pete
resorts to his favorite file-sharing software to download it. But when
Pete learns that he cannot view the content without a password, he
downloads a program that will figure out the password and open the
files without the NFL’s authorization. Shortly after downloading the
files, Pete receives a letter from the NFL threatening him with a lawsuit
for violating its copyright in the Championship Package. Fearing a
protracted legal battle with the NFL, Pete capitulates and pays the NFL
the $1000 it demands to avoid the suit.
1. Fantasy sports is a multimillion dollar industry in which Pete (“owner”) “drafts”
athletes from various professional sports teams. In a given period of time (usually one week)
the owners compete against other owners by comparing the statistics of their drafted athletes
against those of the other owners. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
2. The case Pete heard about is C.B.C. Distributing & Marketing, Inc. See generally id.
(holding that the defendant was unable to prevent fantasy baseball providers from using the
players’ names and statistics in its services).
3. Although a brief visit to the NFL’s fantasy football website, http://www.nfl.com
/fantasy (last visited Sept. 19, 2007), reveals that the NFL does have a market presence in the
fantasy sports industry, the NFL’s appearance in this paper is purely hypothetical and all facts
are devised by the author solely for the purpose of illustration.
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Unfortunately for Pete, there was no way for him to know whether
the NFL would actually bring suit, or even if it would succeed. Of
course, if Pete had contacted his attorney, he would have learned that
the NFL’s claims were not nearly as strong as they stated in their letter.
In fact, for reasons explained below, the forms and data collections were
probably not copyrightable at all. However, depending on where the
NFL brought suit, Pete could be liable for claims under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) even though an infringement claim
would likely fail.
The Courts of Appeals are split in how they would handle Pete’s
case. Some would find liability under the DMCA, even though no
infringement actually took place. Others would likely hold that various
copyright doctrines, like merger and scènes à faire (which are related to
the idea/expression dichotomy), would eviscerate the NFL’s
infringement claims, and therefore hold that a lack of protectable
subject matter would foreclose the NFL’s DMCA claim altogether.
Despite the theoretical nature of this scenario, a successful DMCA
4
claim does not need to be supported by a valid infringement suit. To
make matters worse, these claims place most of the burden on putative
5
defendants who may have difficulty defending the action or raising a
6
copyright misuse defense.
This Comment will analyze the impending collision between the
DMCA and the idea/expression dichotomy. Part I will provide an
overview of the relevant copyright fundamentals (including
constitutional and statutory requirements, infringement, the
idea/expression dichotomy, and relevant portions of the DMCA). After
establishing these basic copyright principles, this Comment will analyze
the collision between the DMCA and the idea/expression dichotomy in
Part II. Finally, in Part III, this Comment will suggest that the tools
necessary to resolve the circuit split and provide stability to this
emerging aspect of the law already exist and should be widely
implemented.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS
Although this Comment does not depend upon an intricate
knowledge of the history and evolution of copyright law throughout
4. Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 543 (2005).
5. Id. at 492.
6. Id.
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American history, a handy understanding of basic principles will help
the reader. Accordingly, before delving into any specific arguments,
this Part will discuss constitutional requirements for copyright
protection, provide an overview of copyright infringement, and look at
the relevant doctrines for excluding copyright protection. Finally, this
Part will close with a brief overview of the DMCA.
A. The Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Copyright
The federal government derives its authority to create and regulate
copyright from the Constitution. Article I vests Congress with the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
7
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” From this archaic grant
of power, Congress has created the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011332. Since the Copyright Act of 1790, copyright jurisprudence has
evolved to recognize two fundamental constitutional requirements
before copyright protection will attach to a work: originality and
8
fixation.
The first, and until recently the most controversial, requirement for
copyright protection is that of originality. By statute, copyright only
9
protects “original works of authorship.”
Although this essential
underpinning was greatly simplified in Feist Publications v. Rural
10
originality plays an essential role in
Telephone Service Co.,
understanding the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrines of
merger and scènes à faire. Justice O’Connor described originality as the

7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of
Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317 (2000) (providing an in-depth analysis of the
Court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act, beginning with the adoption of the IP Clause,
extending through the holding of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991), and ending with a prediction for the Court’s future forays into copyright
law). See also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 689-99
(2003) (advocating that evidentiary concerns also are through minimal copyright
requirements).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). See also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,
910 n.10 (1980) (describing the inclusion of the statutorily mandated originality requirement).
10. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60, 363 (1991)
(repudiating the “sweat of the brow” doctrine as justifying copyright protection of works
lacking a de minimus amount of originality). Although some degree of originality has always
been required for copyright protection, the Feist Court used relatively underutilized portions
of previous case law to establish the modern concept of originality. See Lichtman, supra note
8, at 689-99.
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11

“sine qua non” of copyright and ultimately recognized originality, and
thus copyright, as “requir[ing] independent creation plus a modicum of
12
In doing so, the Court refused to extend copyright
creativity.”
protection to a telephone directory and eliminated the popular “sweat
13
14
of the brow” doctrine in favor of the originality requirement. Not
surprisingly, Justice O’Connor’s “modicum of creativity” language has
become an essential aspect of defining whether a work is “original.” In
addition to excising the “sweat of the brow” doctrine from American
copyright jurisprudence, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding
rationale for an originality requirement:
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that
every element of the work may be protected. Originality
remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright
protection may extend only to those components of a work that
are original to the author. Thus, if the compilation author
clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may
be able to claim a copyright in this written expression. Others
may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the
15
precise words used to present them.
In this way, originality serves a limited gate keeping function that
prevents copyright from granting monopoly protection to authors over
facts and ideas that are otherwise necessary to “promote Progress.” In
the hypothetical described at the beginning of this Comment, the NFL’s
data collection of player statistics is analogous to the phone book in
Feist in that any useful iteration of the data will render the collection
non-original, and thus lacking the “creative spark” required for
originality.
In addition to originality, the Court has also established “fixation” as

11. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
12. Id. at 346.
13. The “sweat of the brow” doctrine has roots in an agrarian metaphor used to justify
the extension of copyright protection to those works that, although lacking in originality,
required great effort to create. The metaphor likens the author’s work to that of a farmer
who plants seeds, toils in the sun, and ultimately harvests a crop. Under this reasoning, some
foreign governments will grant protection to collections of information. Patricia Loughlan,
Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes . . . The Metaphors of Intellectual Property,
28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211, 222 n.36 (2006).
14. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
15. Id. at 348 (internal citations omitted). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985) (balancing the public’s rights under the First
Amendment against an individual copyright holder’s rights afforded by the Copyright Act);
Lichtman, supra note 8, at 703; Hamilton, supra note 8, at 344.
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a predicate for copyright protection.
Although fixation as a
17
requirement for protection seems rather obvious, its own evolution is
as convoluted as that of originality, a fact exacerbated by the lag
18
between technological innovation and legislative adaptation.
In
creating the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress finally sought to place the
law ahead of technology by establishing fixation as “any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, . . . either directly
19
or with the aid of a machine or device.” In this sense, fixation clearly
applies to written words, but also applies to recorded sounds and even
20
more transitory alternatives, such as a computer’s RAM. Accordingly,
there should be no doubt that the NFL’s files are sufficiently fixed for
the purposes of copyright.
B. Infringement
The provisions governing infringement under the Copyright Act are
21
found under Chapter Five, §§ 501-512. Infringement occurs when the
defendant has “violate[d] any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
22
Generally speaking, these exclusive rights include
owner.”
unauthorized copying of the work, along with unauthorized distribution
23
and performance.
Accordingly, the courts have devised a standard
format to prove that a defendant did in fact violate one of the plaintiff’s
exclusive rights.
Successful copyright infringement actions generally rely only upon
24
the satisfaction of a two-part test created by the Supreme Court. First,
25
the plaintiff must show the ownership of a valid copyright. Next, the
aggrieved owner must show that the defendant’s work has copied
26
original elements of the infringed work. As copyright plaintiffs know,
however, the satisfaction of these elements is not always as easy as it
16. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 718 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561
(1973)).
17. A basic interpretation of “Writings” as referenced by the IP Clause very clearly
establishes some type of tangibility of the work as a constitutional requirement.
18. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 716-23.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
20. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 716-17.
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-12 (2006).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). Section 501 refers to sections 106-21, but section 106
delineates the owner’s exclusive rights.
24. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
25. Id.
26. Id.

2008] THE DMCA AND THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY

137

may seem. Although the first element can be satisfied by the
presentation of a “timely obtained” Certificate of Registration from the
27
U.S. Copyright Office, satisfying the second element is rarely as
simple.
The second element of copyright infringement, termed “actionable
28
copying” by the Fifth Circuit, breaks down into two elements. These
29
include proof of “factual copying” and “substantial similarity.” It is
the rare case that a copyright plaintiff has direct evidence of the
defendant factually copying the infringed work. When this direct
evidence does not exist, courts will infer copying if the plaintiff can show
that defendant 1) had access to the infringed work, and 2) “the accused
30
work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s” protected work.
To
further complicate matters, the “substantially similar” requirement of
actionable copying differs from the “substantially similar” requirement
of factual copying, giving rise to a reinvention of terms, as it were, by
31
According to the Fifth Circuit, the term
the Fifth Circuit.
“substantially similar” only refers to the final comparison between the
32
two works that will establish actionable copying. When a court looks
to establish factual copying in the Fifth Circuit, access to the infringed
33
Because of the
work must be coupled with “probative similarity.”
more precise nature of the Fifth Circuit’s terminology, this Comment
34
will utilize these terms in lieu of the more traditional vocabulary.
In Pete’s situation, the NFL can more than likely demonstrate actual
copying by proving 1) that the files are on Pete’s computer, and 2) that
Pete did not pay for them. This situation differs from most infringement
claims because the court will not have to decide if Pete created a work
that infringes on the NFL’s rights. Even though Pete may not have to
worry about an actual test for substantial similarity, these various tests

27. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993).
28. Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.
2004).
29. Id.
30. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005).
31. Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 367.
32. Id. at 368 n.7.
33. Id.
34. According to the Fifth Circuit, these terms have also been adopted by the First,
Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. See, e.g., Dam Things From Den. v. Russ
Berrie & Co., Inc., 290 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002); Transwestern Pub. Co. LP v. Multimedia
Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television,
Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir.
1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995).
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are important because, as will be discussed below, certain infringement
tests predispose a court to find liability under the DMCA even when no
infringement has taken place.
Myriad tests have evolved among the various Courts of Appeals for
determining “substantial similarity” between the protected and
infringing works. Because the focal point of this Comment resides at
the intersection of copyright infringement and the DMCA, several of
the more noteworthy tests are discussed below.
1. The Arnstein and Ordinary Observer Tests
One of the earlier tests used by the courts was devised by the Second
35
The basis of modern infringement
Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter.
jurisprudence can be clearly seen in this test as the court required proof
36
not only of copying but also of improper appropriation. The copying
prong can be proven with either an admission of copying by the
37
defendant or with evidence of access.
Only if copying is proven,
should the court come to the question of “unlawful appropriation,”
38
which is gauged by “the response of the ordinary lay hearer.”
Interestingly, while expert testimony and dissection may be considered
in the first portion of the test, they are immaterial in the second portion
39
of the test.
The Arnstein test has evolved into the modern ordinary observer
test, which is used in many circuits to determine “substantial
40
similarity.”
For instance, the First Circuit uses a version of the
35. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
36. Id.at 468.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Jeffrey Cadwell, Comment, Expert Testimony, Scènes à faire, and
Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test for Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137 (2005)
(arguing for the use of expert testimony throughout an infringement trial).
40. See, e.g. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
2005) (“The test for substantial similarity may itself be expressed in two parts: whether the
defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work and whether the copying, if proven, went so far as
to constitute an improper appropriation.”) (citations omitted); Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d
1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Two works are substantially similar if an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”)
(citation omitted); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.
2001) (“Whether there is substantial similarity between copyrightable expressions is
determined by the ‘ordinary observer’ test.”); Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533,
541 (3d Cir. 1986) (“A finding of substantial similarity is an ad hoc determination. We apply
the reasonable person standard, under which ‘the test is whether the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material of
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ordinary observer test that mandates both dissection of the work and
42
application of the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. The D.C.
Circuit adopted, in Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, a two-part test that
43
is quite similar to the approach taken by the First Circuit. Under the
Sturdza approach, a court first determines the protectable aspects of the
plaintiff’s work and then compares these to the infringing work using
44
the ordinary observer test. Alternatively, some circuits rely upon the
45
“total concept and feel test.” This test is used to attach liability to
infringers who copy a work that, although meriting protection as a
whole, contains many elements that are not afforded copyright
protection individually.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit employs
46
and “comprehensive nonliteral
“fragmented literal similarity”
47
48
similarity” as part of its ordinary observer test.
2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test
The extrinsic/intrinsic test parallels the “total concept and feel test”
used primarily in the Second Circuit and very clearly has roots in the
49
Arnstein test described above.
Under this test for “substantial
50
similarity,” a court considers two inquiries. The first portion of this
substance and value.’”) (citation omitted).
41. CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., 97 F.3d 1504, 1514 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“[W]e note that the Copyright Act itself seems to mandate the ‘dissection’ of works into
copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements.”).
42. Yankee Candle Co., 259 F.3d at 34 (“[After dissection], we apply the doctrines of
merger and scènes à faire to determine how ‘substantially similar’ the copy must be to
infringe.”).
43. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1295-1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1995).
46. “In many cases an allegedly infringing work will evince ‘fragmented literal
similarity.’ In other words, the work may copy only a small part of the copyrighted work, but
do so word-for-word. If this fragmented copy is important to the copyrighted work, and of
sufficient quantity, then it may support a finding of substantial similarity.” Palmer v. Braun,
287 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2001)).
47. “Nonliteral similarity is more difficult to define. A work may be deemed
substantially similar to another work when it evinces what Nimmer calls ‘comprehensive
nonliteral similarity.’ This comprehensive nonliteral similarity is evident where ‘the
fundamental essence or structure of one work is duplicated in another.’” Palmer, 287 F.3d at
1330 (quoting 4 NIMMER § 13.03[A][1] (2001)).
48. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1330.
49. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 2003)
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test, the “extrinsic” portion, focuses on “specific expressive elements”
including “plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and
51
sequence of events.” If the plaintiff can demonstrate a material issue
of triable fact at this juncture, then the defendant’s likely motion for
52
summary judgment will be denied, and the case will be sent to a jury.
The intrinsic test parallels the ordinary observer test, in that, the inquiry
focuses on whether “the works at issue are so dissimilar that ordinary
‘reasonable minds cannot differ as to the absence of substantial
53
A jury cannot find substantial similarity
similarity in expression.’”
54
without a sufficient evidentiary showing on both tests.
3. Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
55

In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., the Tenth
Circuit adopted the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as a primary
method for analyzing infringement in cases dealing with computer
programs. As its name suggests, this test has three primary phases,
appropriately named abstraction, filtration, and comparison—of which
all are performed on the protected work. The first phase of this test, the
56
abstraction test, has its roots in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. In
this incarnation of the test, the court is to “separate ideas from
57
expression.” This portion of the test will not guide a court towards the
(affirming the district court’s grant of the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction).
51. Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted) (affirming the district court’s finding of a lack of substantial similarity
between the two works).
52. Id.
53. Taylor Corp., 315 F.3d at 1043 (citing Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d
117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987)).
54. Id.
55. 9 F.3d 823, 834-39 (10th Cir. 1993).
56. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). In this decision, the abstraction test was designed to
determine that no infringement occurred even though two plays centered around a family
feud between an Irish family and a Jewish family that is exacerbated by the marriage of two
children and quelled by the birth of a grandchild. Judge Hand described this test as follows:
[W]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an abstract of the whole,
decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of
the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but
there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121 (citation omitted).
57. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 834 (citation omitted).

2008] THE DMCA AND THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY

141

protectable elements, but merely “divides the . . . program segments
into layers of abstraction and determine whether the contents of that
58
Upon completion of
segment depict an idea, process or method.”
abstraction, a court should proceed to the filtration phase, where it is to
focus on the elimination of unprotectable elements, including those
59
elements that are specified in § 102(b) or judicially-created, as in
60
merger or scènes à faire.
Ideally, this process will isolate those
elements of the work that are protectable for comparison in the final
61
At this point, the court should compare the
phase, comparison.
protectable elements against the infringing work and determine if they
have been copied and if the copying “constitute[s] a substantial part of
62
the original work.”
C. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Related Exclusionary Devices
Common throughout all of the various tests for infringement
described above is the assumption of protectable material. As stated
earlier, copyright protection does not extend to every element of a
copyrighted work. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act specifically
forbids the extension of copyright protection “to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
63
Although each exception enumerated by the statute is
discovery.”
worthy of mention, the dichotomy between ideas and expressions is
especially relevant.
Generally, the idea/expression dichotomy is
invoked to prevent an author from gaining a monopoly over an idea, the
64
antithesis of copyright protection.
The courts have delineated two
other doctrines essential to guarding the boundaries between ideas and
expressions.
1. The Merger Doctrine
As seen in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., ideas by themselves

58. Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th
Cir. 2000).
59. These include “idea[s], procedure[s], process[es], system[s], method[s] of operation,
concept[s], principle[s], [and] discover[ies].” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
60. Computer Mgmt. Assistance, 220 F.3d at 401.
61. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838-39.
62. Id. at 839.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
64. “Congress shall have Power To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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are not protected by copyright, and when the idea intertwines with the
expression such that it is impossible to separate them, the expression is
66
The necessity of the merger
said to have “merged” with the idea.
doctrine was first observed in the late 1960s by the First Circuit in
67
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co. Merger arises when “the topic
necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a
limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
68
possibilities of future use of the substance.”
In Morrissey, the court was faced with two parties who each claimed
69
rights in a set of rules for a contest. Of course, the challenges in a case
like this lie in both the application of the law to the facts at issue and the
policy concerns that develop from overprotection and underprotection.
A court in this position faces two choices: (1) protect the senior user’s
“expression” and require subsequent authors to reinvent rules for
contests, or (2) declare that the senior user’s expressions were so
70
fundamentally tied to the ideas that protection could not be extended.
The Morrissey court recognized the impossible nature of the first option
71
and established the merger doctrine.
Returning to Pete and the NFL, the merger doctrine prevents
copyright protection from attaching to any individual record within the
NFL’s data collection. Furthermore, even if the data collection were
able to receive protection as a whole, the information would itself be
unprotectable, and if Pete could show the court that the statistics (ideas
and facts) could not be expressed in any other way than the data
records, then the merger doctrine would operate to render the NFL’s
collection unprotectable.
However, determining whether an idea and its expression have
merged requires “considerable care” on the part of the courts because
too liberal an application of the doctrine can result in underprotection
72
while too sparing an application could end in overprotection. While

65. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.). See
supra note 56.
66. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 735.
67. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
68. Id. at 678.
69. Id. at 676.
70. See Lichtman, supra note 8, at 735-36.
71. Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678 (“We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in
which the public can be checkmated.”).
72. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
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the doctrine itself is fairly well settled, its application is not without
73
controversy, as seen below.
2. Scènes à Faire
The doctrine of scènes à faire has its roots both in the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fundamental copyright requirement
of originality. This doctrine was first recognized in Schwartz v.
74
Universal Pictures Co., where the court imported this French phrase—
which literally means “scenes which ‘must’ be done,”—to prevent a
finding of infringement “merely because both [parties] made use of an
75
In a more modern setting, the Seventh Circuit has
old situation.”
interpreted scènes à faire to mean that infringement will not be found on
the basis of elements that are so “rudimentary, commonplace, standard,
or unavoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within a
76
class of works from another.”
Instead of foreclosing expression per se, as merger does, scènes à
faire is rooted in the public domain and has been traditionally based
upon “expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes,
77
events and characterization.” In Gaiman v. McFarlane, the Seventh
Circuit considered scènes à faire as it applied to an “unexpectedly
78
Even though a
knowledgeable old wino” in the plaintiff’s work.
character like this would not normally be copyrightable, the court
afforded protection because the plaintiff had provided sufficient literary
79
detail for the character to acquire a “distinctive” nature. Although
Judge Posner used the word “distinctive,” the key to the wino’s
protection rested in the author’s ability to differentiate this wino from
the public domain wino by imbuing the character with sufficient
originality so as to merit copyright protection. Gaiman’s wino contrasts
nicely with this Comment’s nondescript Pete. By utilizing only
minimally descriptive techniques, the author has relied on the reader to
use stereotypical sports fan qualities to “flesh out” Pete’s details.

73. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 557 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Feikens, J., dissenting) (discussing the growing circuit split and advocating that the Sixth
Circuit join the Second and Ninth Circuits in its approach).
74. 85 F. Supp 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
75. Id. at 275.
76. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bucklew v.
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)).
77. Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660.
79. Id.
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Whereas the wino was afforded protection for being sufficiently
distinctive, Pete possesses no details that differentiate him from the
stereotypical sports fan. Therefore, Pete is not sufficiently original and
the author will not likely be able to protect Pete using copyright law.
In traditional media, scènes à faire refers to treatments of characters,
plots, or other elements that are so basic as to be considered
80
“indispensable.” However, as copyright has been expanded to
computer programs, this doctrine now applies to programming elements
81
that are necessitated by hardware and mechanical restrictions.
Because of their involuntary or even mandatory nature, elements that
qualify as scènes à faire are not afforded any protection under copyright.
D. The DMCA
Congress incorporated the DMCA into the Copyright Act in 1998
for two primary reasons. First, the DMCA was perceived as required
for compliance with the United States’ World Intellectual Property
82
83
Additionally,
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty obligations.
Congress was lobbied by the various entertainment industries to
promulgate the DMCA in order to bulk up their rights in digital
84
The effect of this legislation has been to provide copyright
media.
owners with an additional cause of action if an infringer bypasses a
85
“technological measure” in order to infringe on the owner’s copyright.
The DMCA provides this protection through three primary
80. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982).
If a drunken old bum were a copyrightable character, so would be a drunken
suburban housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking
cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, a masked magician,
and . . . a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a
vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. It would be difficult
to write successful works of fiction without negotiating for dozens or hundreds of
copyright licenses, even though such stereotyped characters are the products not of
the creative imagination but of simple observation of the human comedy.
Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (citations omitted).
81. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Third Circuit refers to this specific application of scènes à faire as “the doctrine of
externalities.” Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d
197, 214 (3rd Cir. 2002).
82. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65
(1997).
83. Marcus Howell, Note, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the Aftermarket, 11
B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 128, 139 (2005).
84. Lipton, supra note 4, at 493.
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001).
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methods. While the first line of defense prohibits any person from
“circumvent[ing] a technological measure” in order to gain access to a
86
protected work, the other two limitations ban “trafficking” of anti87
circumvention measures.
The two anti-trafficking provisions are
surprisingly similar on a textual level, but they each protect a distinct
aspect of anti-circumvention technology. On the one hand, §1201(a)(2)
protects “technological measure[s] that effectively control access to a
88
On the other hand, § 1201(b)(1) protects
[copyrighted] work.”
“technologies designed to permit access to a work but prevent[ing]
89
copying of the work or some other act that infringes a copyright.”
Although the robust protection that the DMCA offers has enabled
copyright holders to expand their sales to the digital world (i.e., the
Internet), the DMCA is not without its critics. First, plaintiffs suing
under the DMCA need not show that there is a valid copyright
90
infringement claim underlying the DMCA claim.
This has led to
91
manufacturers stifling competition by threatening costly lawsuits and
has some commentators contemplating whether the archaic copyright
92
misuse doctrine should be invoked.
II. WHAT DO WE DO WITH A DOCTRINE LIKE MERGER?
The doctrines of merger and scènes à faire generally play important
93
roles in preserving Congress’s constitutional mandates. Accordingly,
any encroachment into this territory should be accepted only after
careful and skeptical consideration. As indicated above, one such
94
putative invasion has risen in a seemingly innocuous form: the DMCA.
To be certain, the collision that this Comment foresees is not centered
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
88. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 441 (emphasis added).
89. Corley, 273 F.3d at 441 (discussing the protections afforded by 17 U.S.C. §
1201(b)(1)).
90. Lipton, supra note 4, at 544.
91. Howell, supra note 83, at 152.
92. “Misuse is an equitable doctrine, with roots in the patent world, in which a
defendant in an infringement action may prevail if he can show, as a defense, that the patent
owner has attempted to extend his patent into areas not protected by the governmental
grant.” Heather, A. Sapp, Note, Garage Door Openers and Toner Cartridges: Why Congress
Should Revisit the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
135, 159 (2006).
93. This includes not only the preamble to the IP Clause (“to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts”), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but also the restrictions placed upon
the regulation of free speech preserved by the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2006).
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on the DMCA exclusively, but on the intersection of that Act with the
judicial doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. To be even more precise,
it is only the methods in which a few circuits are approaching this
intersection that are troublesome.
A. The DMCA and Its Collision with the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
What this all boils down to is that when the merger and scènes à faire
doctrines interact with any type of anti-circumvention protocol designed
to protect copyrightable material, certain applications of the doctrines
create liability under the DMCA even where there is no liability under
traditional infringement statutes. The federal Courts of Appeals are
currently split over when to apply the merger and scènes à faire
95
doctrines—before or after infringement analysis. For the most part,
this detail of the infringement analysis has remained a curio of copyright
law, but when the DMCA enters the picture, this seemingly minute
detail makes all the difference in the world.
1. Merger and Scènes à Faire as Affirmative Defenses to Copyright
Liability
Despite courts’ general reliance on the axiom that an idea cannot be
copyrighted, a few commentators maintain that despite the language of
§ 102(b), copyright protection is properly extended to unprotectable
elements while the idea/expression dichotomy (and the various related
96
doctrines) merely serves as a defense to liability. Courts relegate the
merger and scènes à faire doctrines to the realm of affirmative defenses
97
for a few primary reasons. First, some courts argue that predicating
copyrightability on these doctrines will actually invalidate copyright law
98
somehow. Alternatively, circuits that utilize the extrinsic/intrinsic or
“total look and concept” tests for substantial similarity (e.g., the Second
and Ninth Circuits) are more prone to apply merger and scènes à faire as
99
affirmative defenses.
The Second Circuit seems to be the strongest judicial advocate for
95. Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP’s Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software
Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 213 n.46 (2006).
96. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[D]
(2007).
97. For the purposes of this Comment, this argument will be referenced as the
“affirmative defense” approach.
98. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1991).
99. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 557-59 (6th Cir.
2004) (Feikins, J., dissenting).
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the extreme position that the “misapplication” of the merger and scènes
à faire doctrines somehow act to invalidate copyright. In Kregos v.
Associated Press, the plaintiff created, and registered with the Copyright
Office, a form that was used to publish pitching statistics in baseball
100
When the AP published a form that was nearly identical,
games.
Kregos filed suit in the Southern District of New York, where the court
101
granted the AP’s summary judgment motion. On review, the Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision holding that the Second
Circuit “consider[s] [the] so-called ‘merger’ doctrine in determining
whether actionable infringement has occurred, rather than whether a
102
In coming to this holding, the Second Circuit
copyright is valid.”
argued that an examination of merger in this light would allow for a
103
“more detailed and realistic basis for evaluating the claim.” The court
also felt that when merger is applied to prevent copyrightability (or as
the court claimed, copyright invalidity), there is a danger of over or
104
underprotection of copyrighted works.
Alternatively, courts that apply the “total look and concept test”
argue that merger and scènes à faire should only be applied as
affirmative defenses. The Second Circuit suggests that “courts may lose
sight of the forest for the trees [b]y factoring out similarities based on
105
non-copyrightable elements.”
Along similar lines, in applying the
intrinsic/extrinsic test, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits also argue that the
affirmative defense line of reasoning is essential to protecting the work
as a whole. Finally, the Seventh Circuit is also concerned with
protecting the author who relies on utilizing “nonprotectable” scènes à
106
faire themes in her works.
2. Applying Merger and Scènes à Faire at the Threshold of Copyright
The alternative application of the merger and scènes à faire doctrines
occurs before infringement is even determined, so as to prevent
107
copyright from ever attaching.
Proponents of this application rely

100. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702.
101. Id. at 703.
102. Id. at 705.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1996).
107. Because this argument applies the idea/expression dichotomy (and related
doctrines) at the outset of the copyright determination, this Comment will refer to the
argument as the “threshold” approach.
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principally on the text of the Copyright Act and the landmark decision
108
Baker v. Selden. The argument, simplistic in its design, centers on the
fact that § 102(b) of the Copyright Act prevents copyright protection.
The language in question provides that “[i]n no case does copyright
109
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea.” As
the Fifth Circuit held in Kern River:
When the “idea” and its “expression” are thus inseparable,
copying the “expression” will not be barred, since protecting the
“expression” in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of
the “idea” upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and
110
limitations imposed by the patent law.
This rationale underpins the very reasoning for using the merger
doctrine. Furthermore, as the Court noted in Baker v. Selden, giving an
author monopoly rights in the ideas she expresses works “a fraud upon
111
the public.”
B. Lexmark International v. Static Control Components

112

Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a manufacturer of printers
and ink cartridges that brought suit against Static Control Components
113
(SCC), a manufacturer of microchips. Lexmark’s action was based on
SCC’s duplication of programs Lexmark used in its ink cartridges to
calculate toner level, which included a “Toner Loading Program”
114
In selling its printers, Lexmark created a classification of
(TLP).
“Prebate” cartridges, which were sold to the consumer, but carried a
contractual provision that required the consumer to use the cartridge
115
just once and return it to Lexmark where it could be refilled. Without
this type of system, it is common for these cartridges to be refilled by a
116
third party and reused. Lexmark enforced the prebate agreement by
installing a microchip on the printer that functioned like a “lock” and a
108. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1890) (holding that blank accounting forms are ideas in and of
themselves, and therefore not entitled to copyright protection).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
110. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir.
1990) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (5th Cir.
1971) (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 103)).
111. 101 U.S. at 102.
112. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004).
113. Id. at 529.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 530.
116. Id.
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117

separate microchip on the cartridge that functioned like a “key.” This
system was designed so that users would only be able to use cartridges
sold by Lexmark with Lexmark printers. However, SCC manufactured
and sold a microchip (SMARTEK) to generic ink cartridge
manufacturers that was not only designed to function like the “key”
118
microchip in Lexmark’s cartridges, but also carried Lexmark’s TLP.
Lexmark, believing its printer programs to be protected by copyright,
filed suit alleging copyright infringement and violations of the DMCA’s
119
anti-circumvention provisions.
Although the district court found SCC liable on all counts, the Sixth
120
Circuit reversed. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Lexmark’s security
protocol (the proverbial lock and key) was essentially a “lock-out code”
to which copyright protection was denied by the doctrines of merger
121
and scènes à faire. Furthermore, because of the hardware constraints
on the TLP, it was also considered nonprotectable because it constituted
122
a scènes à faire element. The court went on to determine that because
the Printer Engine Program (PEP) on the cartridge was accessible
without bypassing the security protocol, the DMCA was not
123
The court likened Lexmark’s “security protocol” to a
implicated.
house where the back door was locked but the front door was left
124
open.
However, the Sixth Circuit’s holding was qualified by all manner of
provisos and caveats. First, the Sixth Circuit was only overturning a
decision to grant a preliminary injunction; the court was careful to allow
125
Furthermore, as
the District Court sufficient latitude on remand.
noted above, the Lexmark decision evades the DMCA issues, and this
opinion actually provides a recipe for holders who wish to use the
126
They need only utilize
DMCA to protect unprotectable material.
“[t]he combination of a powerful technological lock and contractual
license terms forbidding purchases to access relevant code [to] create a

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 531.
120. Id. at 551.
121. Id. at 542.
122. Id. at 544.
123. The mere act of purchasing a Lexmark printer allowed the user to lawfully access
the protected software. Id. at 546-47.
124. Id. at 547.
125. Lipton, supra note 4, at 509.
126. Id. at 506.
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situation where . . . Lexmark would not apply.”

127

III. HARMONIZING THE INTERACTION
Although the debate surrounding the application of merger and
scènes à faire has been primarily a scholarly one up until now, as
evidenced in Lexmark, copyright owners’ increasing reliance upon
technology-based protection of their works necessarily implicates a
greater number of DMCA-based claims. Furthermore, that a defendant
could be found liable under the DMCA even if there was no copyright
128
Of course, some
infringement runs contrary to Congress’s intent.
circuits have already adopted the approach necessary to prevent this
bewildering liability. The Fifth Circuit, for example, expressly chose
129
such a position in Mason v. Montgomery Data Inc. in accordance with
130
its Kern River decision.
The logic behind the threshold option is overwhelming. In addition
to actually complying with the basic constitutional and statutory
constraints of copyright, which the affirmative defense option does not,
the threshold option more accurately reflects the legislative intent of the
DMCA. Furthermore, the threshold option avoids the confusing legal
fictions that the affirmative defense option creates.
Applying the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire as affirmative
defenses undermines the constitutional underpinnings of copyright. As
stated above, the Feist Court confirmed that originality is the “sine qua
131
non of copyright.” With a doctrine like scènes à faire, which is at least
partly justified as preventing unoriginal ideas from receiving copyright
protection, this fundamental concept directly prevents copyright from
attaching in the first place. This certainly explains why the Second
Circuit, a staunch advocate for the affirmative defense application of
merger, stated that “scènes à faire are not copyrightable as a matter of
132
Furthermore, because facts “may not be copyrighted and are
law.”
133
part of the public domain available to every person,”
Feist also
prevents copyright from attaching to “merged” expression when the
127. Id.
128. Howell, supra note 83, at 152.
129. 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992).
130. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990).
131. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
132. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
scènes à faire in justifying its refusal to extend copyright protection to “standard literary
devices”).
133. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted).
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involved “ideas” are facts. Proponents of the affirmative defense
position will argue that this leaves a gap for merged opinions and
fictions—those ideas that are not facts, but still merge with their
134
As the Second Circuit correctly noted in Castle Rock
expression.
Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group Inc., in many circumstances,
these opinions or fictions will more closely resemble expression than
135
anything else—in which case merger is not applicable anyway.
The idea/expression dichotomy prevents authors from obtaining and
136
maintaining monopolies over information. As stated above, this goal
is clearly articulated by § 102(b): “In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
137
embodied in such work.”
There is a valid argument that the affirmative defense approach to
the application of merger and scènes à faire is also justified by the
reading of the statute. After all, the text does not deny copyright, but
copyright protection. Logically then, as the argument goes, Congress’s
decision to only deny copyright protection tacitly stands for the
proposition that Congress did not mean to deny copyright entirely.
Therefore, the only method by which the courts can accurately reflect
this distinction is by denying protection to unprotectable elements while
maintaining protection in the work as a whole.
This argument, however, is deceiving for several reasons. Taking the
constitutional argument into account, it is impossible for Congress to
138
statutorily regulate outside of the scope that the Constitution allows.
But beyond the constitutional limits, this argument creates a unique

134. But see Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ’g Group Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138-39 (2d
Cir. 1998) (refuting the defendant’s contention that trivia derived from a television show’s
fictitious storylines do not constitute “facts,” but protectable expression).
135. Id.
136. Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
138. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803). As the Court famously stated:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits
may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction,
between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited
and acts allowed, are of equal obligation.
Id.
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judicial paradox: “a court which finds that merger exists should hold
that the two works in questions are not ‘substantially similar,’ even
where they are in fact identical, a result which I view as a not useful
139
variety of doublespeak.” It seems, then, that this judicial doublespeak
is tailored expressly to create liability where none should normally
140
exist.
Furthermore, Congress’s intent in enacting the DCMA was not to
create additional liability by significantly altering the contours of
copyright law. As stated above, Congress envisioned the DMCA to
141
142
combat copyright piracy and as satisfying U.S. treaty obligations.
Allowing copyright holders to successfully bring claims under the
auspices of the DMCA when none of their exclusive copyrights have
been violated certainly does not comply with either of these stated aims.
Finally, under the Lexmark majority’s holding, another interesting
approach is engendered that ultimately supports the threshold
approach. Under the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Lexmark, the circuit
split is immaterial because parallel terminology is used in the relevant
statutes. A literal reading of § 102(b) only affords copyright protection
to those elements of a work on the expression side of the
idea/expression dichotomy. The DMCA specifically only applies to
143
those works that are protected by the Copyright Act.
Therefore, a
work denied copyright protection by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act
should also be denied protection under the DMCA. Accordingly, a very
literal reading of both statutes, such as that one taken by the Sixth
Circuit, renders the whole discussion quite one-sided, and the circuit
split obsolete.
CONCLUSION
Courts have created several doctrines to enforce the idea/expression
dichotomy, including merger and scènes à faire. Up until 1998, this

139. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
140. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 558 (6th
Cir. 2004) (Feikens, J., dissenting). “I would hold that in cases where the merger is with a
method of operation, the merger doctrine should be applied as a defense to infringement
only, and not as informing the question of copyrightability.” Id. Note that under this
approach, merger would preclude copyrightability under all other circumstance but be
modified just for this case so that liability would attach.
141. Lipton, supra note 4, at 493.
142. Howell, supra note 83, at 138-39.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
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discourse has been more or less scholarly in its approach, but when
Congress enacted the DMCA the realm of protectable works and their
constituent elements began to play a much more important role. It is
now possible for copyright holders to receive damages from an
“infringing” defendant even when no copyright infringement has
occurred. However, the arguments that support this putative liability
lack proper constitutional, statutory, and logical support. Therefore,
courts should ignore any doctrine that purports to protect unprotectable
works and refuse to ascribe liability to defendants who have not violated
any copyright laws.
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